North Korea's nuclear policy towards the U.S. The bureaucratic politics model

North Korea is a typical authoritarian state, thus the decision-making process in the North Korean government tends toward the top-down structure. However, even in the authoritarian North Korean regime, the leader cannot control all the issues. When it comes to economic and foreign policy, bureaucrats do retain some freedom of action in their roles due to the complexity of the issues. This paper argues that conflicts, competition and "pulling and hauling" did occur among North Korean bureaucrats and governmental agencies. For example, North Korea initially resisted special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby accommodating the hard-liners' claims. However, pragmatic moderates gradually made their voice heard. In the end, North Korea accepted special inspections, following the moderates' opinions, yet managed to delay them until a significant portion of the light water reactor project was completed. In addition, the North also agreed to move the spent fuel rods out of North Korea, but postponed this until the completion of the first light water reactor. The dismantlement of the radiochemical laboratory and reactors (5MW, 50MW and 200MW) was also delayed until the completion of the light water reactors following the compromise between the hard-liners and soft-liners.