North Korea's nuclear question: Sense of vulnerability, defensive motivation and peaceful solution

With little faith in reaching a peaceful and sustainable solution to the nuclear question through engagement and negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang, some scholars argue that nuclear nonproliferation can be forced on North Korea only through the use of coercive tools within a general framework of containment. Other scholars, alarmed by the catastrophe that might result from a vigorous attempt to confront and/ or topple the regime in Pyongyang, suggest bypassing it and engaging the North Korean people, hoping that they will gain enough power to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclear-free country. Indeed, to a great extent, current American policy toward North Korea reflects both stances. North Korea's history indicates that Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability is directly related to the developmental status of its nuclear program. This deviates from Nicholas Eberstadt's claim that the regime's rationale behind the program has been predominantly and persistently offensive since its initiation. On the other hand, this supports Joachim Krause and Andreas Wenger's claim that the predominant rationale behind Pyongyang's nuclear program is deterring what it perceives as a threat to the survivability of its regime--namely, to a large extent, American power. On the basis of this finding, it can be argued that if North Korea's perceived vulnerability can be significantly reduced, it is more likely to give up its nuclear arms program. How, then, can Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability be significantly reduced? The observation herein suggests that Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability has been more influenced by its perception of its adversaries' hostility than its perception of its allies' guarantee for its security. During the 1960s, Pyongyang perceived that its allies had strong interests in guaranteeing North Korean security, but its perception of the continuous hostility from its adversaries increased its sense of vulnerability, which resulted in its continuous pursuit of developing a nuclear program. Despite the decreasing guarantee by Moscow and Beijing for Pyongyang's security since the late 1960s, Washington's progressive approach toward Pyongyang had so significantly reduced its sense of vulnerability from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s as to persuade North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. This indicates that the key to reducing North Korea's sense of vulnerability and to bringing it back into compliance with international nonproliferation regimes is in the hands of its adversaries rather than those of its traditional allies. In this sense, it can be assumed that China is not bluffing when it claims that it lacks the necessary leverage to push North Korea into an internationally agreed solution to the nuclear problem. America's calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea may thus not yield a significant breakthrough in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The key factors determining Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability, and hence the future of its nuclear program, are U.S. projects and, more importantly, the manner in which its messages are perceived by North Korea. In this sense, the two previous U.S. administrations' policies toward the North Korean nuclear question can provide invaluable lessons to the contemporary U.S. Government. The 1994 Framework Agreement manifested, among other attributes, tolerance towards diversity, a theme borrowed from President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's foreign policy during the 1970s. President Bill Clinton, who included in the agreement the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang, signaled the de facto acceptance of the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang, a clear divergence from his goal of spreading liberalism and democracy, which he had pursued since coming to office. Hence, the reasoning of the 1994 agreement was not to first wrest from North Korea its strategic deterrent and then proceed with toppling its regime. On the contrary, the purpose was to incorporate North Korea, as it is, into the international community, with the hope that time would yield a change in the nature of the regime as it mingles with the other members of the international community, particularly the United States. In other words, the purpose was not to convey the sense that the United States was planning to topple or coerce the regime in Pyongyang into a change of nature, but to patiently lure it, by its own consent, into such a change. The Bush administration, seemingly, took an important step toward reducing Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability by expressing its willingness to give assurances to the security of North Korea, to respect its sovereignty, and to take steps toward the normalization of relations-all in return for North Korea's total nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, overshadowing and contradicting those promises and guarantees are the North Korean Human Rights Act, which strives to promote democracy in North Korea at the expense of the totalitarian regime, and the ensuing appointment of a special envoy on human rights in North Korea. Without resolving these contradictions, Washington will continue to project through its foreign policy ambiguous intentions, hindering a significant change in North Korea's sense of vulnerability. From these experiences, the contemporary U.S. Government must learn that engagement with the current regime in Pyongyang and forgoing endeavors to promptly and forcefully push democracy in North Korea are inseparable prerequisites to a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear question.