Overlapping Political Conflicts and Legislative Gridlock: Reforming Financial Supervisory Governance in South Korea

Literature discussing the factors in government and parliament that cause of gridlock is limited in examining cases that occur in contexts where the democratic principle of 'inclusion' expands. This paper analyzes the legislative gridlock revealed in the process of the South Korean government's efforts to pass the Bill of Financial Consumer Protection, beginning in July 2012, from the perspective of overlapping political conflicts among multi-scalar actors. Research shows that the government's desire to reform financial supervisory governance created two cleavages among the multi-scalar actors because of their long-held political interest in the Bill. The conflict intensified as the cleavages overlapped and were presented as one big issue in the history of Korea's financial supervision, which directly facilitated the gridlock. This paper identifies academic implications to advance the study of gridlock and its policy implications, including the need to develop an inter-scalar mediator, which has negative effects on the quality of democracy.