Abstract
This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 767-782 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2013.10 |
Keywords
- (Semi-)relevance principle
- R
- Relevance logic
- RM
Quacquarelli Symonds(QS) Subject Topics
- Philosophy
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